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The Entrepreneurial State Economic
State Goes to Policies and
Europe Europe 1992
John J. Carroll
William E. Hudson
Mark S. Hyde
This article investigates state-level export programs in response to the emerging new
economic and political regime ofEurope 1992. Little related export promotion ac-
tivity is found, even in states reputed to have the most active entrepreneurial policies.
The authors conclude that states have few resources to invest in export promotion
and are inappropriate jurisdictions around which to organize such policy, despite the
much touted "entrepreneurial state.
"
There has been considerable excitement in scholarly circles over the economic
development role that some states are exploring. This active new role, which
Peter Eisinger 1 has labeled the "entrepreneurial state," is being widely discussed, and
considerable attention has been given to the various strategies states might use to
make American industry more competitive at home and, especially, abroad. The
scholarly literature on these innovative approaches has penetrated political circles to
the extent that both "entrepreneurial government" and David Osborne's work2 were
cited by Massachusetts Governor William Weld in his 1991 inaugural address as
providing models for his administration. Among those innovations, special emphasis
has been placed on export promotion as a means of moving beyond the domestic
market for goods and services.
The purpose of this article is to sound a note of caution about the entrepreneurial
state and the state export policies that are thought to characterize it. The extensive-
ness and effectiveness of state export efforts have thus far been minimal, and the fis-
cal constraints under which states operate make it unlikely that these programs will
be substantially expanded. Furthermore, we do not believe that a workable export
policy can be organized and implemented by even the largest of the states operating
alone or by regional groups of states operating through loosely structured interstate
compacts such as the various governors' conferences.
John J. Carroll is professor ofpolitical science, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, and visiting
professor ofpolitical science, University ofHyderabad, India. William E. Hudson is professor ofpolitical
science, Providence College. Mark S. Hyde is professor ofpolitical science, Providence College.
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Entrepreneurial trade policies, if they are to be effective, require coordination,
funding, and policy leadership by the national government, where the legal and con-
stitutional responsibilities to design and implement trade policy are located. In the ab-
sence of federal leadership over the past few years, it is clear that some states have
introduced economic development strategies aimed at foreign as well as domestic
markets, but it is equally clear that these programs are unsubstantial as judged by
staffing levels and potential impact.
While some American states were reorienting their economic development
strategies to promote increased foreign trade, members of the European Economic
Community (EEC) were adopting profound reforms in their relationships, which will
affect American access to their markets. Established in the 1950s by six European
states to promote European political and economic integration in Europe, the EEC in
the early 1980s fell far short of the expectations of its original founders. Although as
early as the mid-1960s the community had created a customs union among members,
the purpose of which was to eliminate formal tariff barriers to trade, it was far from
achieving the free movement of goods, services, and people among its present twelve
members, which was the original goal of the Treaty of Rome, the EEC founding
document.3
Differences in regulations and product standards, national subsidies, limits on capi-
tal movements, and extensive border controls were substantial barriers to a unified
market. The political goals of the Rome treaty were even further from realization
than the economic ones. National states in the EEC did not coordinate their foreign
policies and, except in agriculture, had made little progress in coordinating their
domestic economic policies. In 1985 EEC leaders made two fundamental commit-
ments to alter this situation. First, they approved an amendment to the Treaty of
Rome — the Single European Act — to change decision-making processes in order
to facilitate greater political integration. Second, they set a deadline, December 31,
1992, for completing a true unified market in Europe and approved a specific list of
barriers to trade to be eliminated by the deadline.
The Single European Act and the 1992 unified market program themselves repre-
sent a profound acceleration of European integration, but in December 1991, EEC
heads of government negotiated a plan to tie the community together even more
closely than envisioned in these initiatives. At their biannual meeting of the European
Council, they signed the Maastricht agreement— named for the city where it was
done. The agreement provided for closer political cooperation leading to a single
European currency, including a European central bank, Eurofed, and a single cur-
rency, the ECU. If all member states ratify it, the Maastricht treaty will make the
community a fully integrated economic power early in the next century.4 To the
chagrin of advocates of greater European integration, several events have put ul-
timate ratification of the Maastricht treaty in jeopardy.
The Danes rejected the treaty in a June 1992 referendum, raising questions about
the degree of European public support for greater integration. Although the Irish later
approved their referendum on the Maastricht, and the French, on September 20, nar-
rowly passed theirs, the Danish defeat and new uncertainties about public support
will require a renegotiation of the agreement before it can be implemented.5 English
withdrawal on September 16 from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism—
precursor to eventual monetary union— compounds concerns about the feasibility of
rapid adoption of a common currency.6 Although at this writing the ultimate fate of
20
the Maastricht agreement is uncertain, it is likely the road to monetary union and
greater political cooperation will not be as short or as smooth as envisioned in
Maastricht.
While Europeans have been preoccupied with the grander and even tighter union
envisioned in the Maastricht treaty, the already substantial program to create a
unified market went into effect on schedule on December 31, 1992. The goals of
such a market, agreed to in 1985, will be achieved even if there are substantial
delays and modifications to Maastricht. With or without monetary and political
union, the 1992 European internal market program presents enormous opportunities,
as well as hazards, to American states and their entrepreneurial visions.
Even if Maastricht is not ratified, the 1992 initiative itself will restructure the
ground rules for trade within the European community and between Europe and the
rest of the world. These changes will eliminate the remaining nontariff trade barriers
that restrict the free movement of goods, services, and people among the twelve mem-
ber nations. The 1992 program, no matter what happens to the plans for monetary
union, lays the groundwork for the emergence of a new European economic super-
power of 350 million consumers, perhaps the most prosperous free market in the
world. American businesses, like all world business, will need access to this market
if they are fully to develop their export potential.
If reports of a shift by states to entrepreneurial export policies are correct, one
would expect them to respond to the emergence of this potential European super-
power. 7 Four of America's top nine export markets are within the European Eco-
nomic Community: the United Kingdom ($18.4 billion), West Germany ($14.3
billion), France ($10.1 billion), and the Netherlands ($10.1 billion); the value of 1988
U.S. exports to the EEC nations was $75.6 billion.8 Judging from their speeches,
many of the nation's governors have been highly aware of the importance of foreign
trade and the European markets for their states' economic health. The comments of
Governor Weld of Massachusetts are typical. He told the 1990 New England
Governors Conference that "international trade is not, by any means, an immediate
solution to our economic situation, but it is a solution— and it is a good long-term
solution. . . . Today, almost 70 percent of [Massachusetts] companies do not export a
single product. I'd like to see that figure change." And Governor William O'Neill of
Connecticut stated that "maintaining [our] competitive edge . . . forces us to keep a
constant vigil on world economic developments. Without question, the biggest
economic events of the next decade will take place in Eastern and Western Europe."
By themselves, the states have been able to launch a number of small and often
well-designed programs, but the impact of these programs on state economies has
been and will continue to be minimal. We argue that given the states' limited
autonomy and resources, they can only hope to support small-scale export develop-
ment programs. Substantial expansion of exports from the states will depend more on
federal policy and leadership.
Our review of state policies developed in response to 1992, based on our survey
of the states, will find a broad awareness of the importance of the emerging Europe,
but little concrete action. In this report, we explore the states' responses to develop-
ments in Europe, for an entrepreneurial state would surely need to take the prospect
of this economic colossus into account in its export policy. In conclusion, we specu-
late on the implications of our findings for the possibility of the entrepreneurial state
and the efficacy of export policy at the state level.
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The Entrepreneurial State
The idea of the entrepreneurial state is both descriptive of the new orientation toward
economic development and evocative of a new dynamism at the state level. As a
descriptive term, it tracks the movement from the business-climate-centered policies
of the 1970s to emphasis on the creation of new capital in the 1980s. In the seven-
ties, most states attempted to create attractive business climates through reductions in
corporate taxes, reforms of workers' compensation policies, and enactment of
specific investment incentives.
Economic development professionals were expected to be "smokestack chasers" —
identifying potential businesses to attract, devising appealing investment packages,
and advertising in business publications. The policies of the entrepreneurial state
imply an entirely new style of government intervention, which seeks to develop new
markets, products, production methods, and technologies. The entrepreneurial em-
phasis is on expanding markets through the export of goods and services and the crea-
tion of new industries and products through business-university partnerships, the
infusion of capital, and state sponsorship of research "greenhouses."9
As an evocative term, the entrepreneurial state suggests active management and
direction of the economy in the mode of the "strong states" of Europe and Japan,
rather than the traditionally "weak" model associated with the United States. Eisinger
believes that the entrepreneurial state, like private entrepreneurs, is a dynamic eco-
nomic player that expands market share by finding new markets for old products and
by creating new markets through the production of new products. The state
seeks to identify market opportunities not for its own exclusive gain but on behalf
of private actors whose pursuit of those opportunities may serve public ends. . . .
[Its] role is to identify, evaluate, anticipate, and even help to develop and create
those markets for private producers to exploit, aided if necessary by government
as subsidizer or coinvestor. 10
Used this way, the term "entrepreneurial state" carries the implication that such ac-
tivities are, or are likely to be, a major policy commitment for the states and that
state policies can produce the industrial adjustments to make the United States com-
petitive internationally. This view implies that the states will take responsibility for
economic development policy, relieving the national government of some of its
obligations. As an optimistic President George Bush told the National Governors As-
sociation, governors "are becoming our economic envoys . . . restoring American in-
ternational competitiveness and expanding world markets for American goods and
services." 11 In our view, these arguments grossly overestimate the capacity of the
states to undertake export policies.
Export promotion programs are thought to be archetypical of the new entre-
preneurial approach. These policies are characterized by efforts to stimulate new
demand for existing or new products in foreign markets. Proponents of state export
promotion believe this is an area in which state intervention might make a difference.
According to most observers, despite increasing U.S. export activity in the 1980s,
there remains much untapped potential. 12 While we share the view that the export
potential is great, we argue that the states alone will not be able to tap that potential;
substantial federal initiative is needed.
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The European 1992 initiative is stimulating a complete restructuring of the business
environment on the Continent. One characteristic of Europe 1992, not often em-
phasized in American reports, is its probusiness, neoliberal, as opposed to social
democratic, character. 13 The internal market program focuses completely on changes
in the European marketplace to facilitate economic, that is, business, growth. The
elimination of internal trade barriers is supposed to stimulate the ability of business
to compete both within Europe and with the rest of the world.
Social democratic leaders, like French President Francois Mitterrand, embrace
this program because they saw the economic stagnation of the 1970s threatening
European welfare states, which can exist only on a foundation of economic pros-
perity. Measures to make business more competitive internationally are viewed as a
prerequisite for continuation of improvements in the European standard of living and
an equal distribution of prosperity. The probusiness character of 1992 is consistent as
well with the evolution of economic policies in individual European countries in the
1980s, even those of socialist governments. 14
The decade has seen a shift toward privatization and market-oriented policies in
all countries. Cognizant of this trend and the promise of 1992, European business has
been strongly supportive. Business people believe a unified market will bring oppor-
tunities for growth and profits. In contrast to the slow and hesitant reaction of
European labor, European business has worked actively — and largely successfully —
to prevent the enactment of regulations they view as harmful. 15
Post- 1992 Europe is expected to be an economic colossus and a good place to do
business. The new European order is expected to affect international trade, American
businesses, and state government policies in a number of concrete ways: 16
• After 1992, a firm will need a presence in only one European country and meet
only one set of product standards in order to sell in all twelve EEC countries.
One would expect an entrepreneurial state to develop a variety of programs to
take advantage of the 1992 opportunities to promote state exports.
• Many observers believe that the new Europe will expect reciprocity in laws and
regulations if it is to freely allow American investment and exports. This poses
a challenge to purchasing laws in some states, which require state and local
governments to buy only American or locally produced products. If American
business wishes to bid on European government purchases, states may have to
repeal such laws. 17
• A similar problem exists in the area of financial services. Under EEC regula-
tions, banks in Europe will be able to engage in such practices as establishing
branches in other countries and selling securities, which are restricted under
U.S. federal and state banking laws. Relief for European financial institutions
from these restrictions may be required if the EEC is to permit U.S. banks in
Europe.18
• Europe 1992 will complicate state efforts to attract and retain business invest-
ment. Europe's appeal as an export market will be matched by its attractiveness
as an investment location. Rather than export locally produced products, busi-
nesses may opt to set up joint ventures or their own production facilities in
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Europe. Foreign capital will be more difficult to attract to the United States as
investors like the Japanese shift their investments to Europe. 19
• The heterogeneity of American state regulations and tax laws will reduce the
overall U.S. competitive position as Europe provides a more homogeneous busi-
ness environment. Some experts warn that American states must limit interstate
tax variation, develop common definitions of taxable bases, and pass uniform
regulations, for example, for the trucking industry, if they want to compete for
international capital. 20
• Many trade issues exist between the United States and Europe, which could
pose problems for the entrepreneurial state. These are especially severe in
agriculture, where both the United States and Europe have provided a complex
array of subsidies. In manufacturing, European proposals for "local content" or
"rule of origin" requirements, which mandate that a certain percentage of parts
in products assembled in Europe be produced in Europe, will interfere with ex-
ports from many states.21
Given the opportunities and challenges of the Europe 1992 deadline, how are the
states preparing to respond? To answer this question, we concentrated on sixteen
states with the most active and innovative economic development programs. These
are the fourteen states that Gray and Lowry22 identify as industrial policy activists,
plus two additional states from their "moderate" category,23 which are frequently
cited as industrial policy innovators in the anecdotal literature. Gray and Lowry rank
the states on a five-point index of industrial policy activism depending on how many
of four targeted incentive programs they have adopted.24
We do not make a careful distinction between the terms "entrepreneurial state"
and "industrial policy," because they refer to essentially the same set of phenomena.
Although the term lacks precise definition, "industrial policy" refers to a com-
prehensive set of economic development policies designed by government to restruc-
ture the industrial base. The term "entrepreneurial state" is used to emphasize the
high level of governmental activism that "demand-side" industrial policies require.
For this reason, the entrepreneurial states cited by Eisinger and Osborne comprise vir-
tually the same cluster of states that Gray and Lowry identify as active industrial
policy states.
We used a mail survey, with follow-up telephone interviews in some states, to ask
international trade directors how their states were responding. We also conducted per-
sonal interviews with several international trade specialists in New England. Table 1
summarizes the 1992 related activities reported in the sixteen entrepreneurial states.
The most interesting finding is that six states reported no special activities related to
Europe 1992. In one case, Montana, the state was simply disinterested: Montana
promotes exports only to the Far East. However, the other five states all maintain at
least one office in Europe and report continued interest in exporting to the Continent.
Some of the disinterested states expressed awareness that the 1992 deadline was ap-
proaching, but saw no need for special activity. For a third of our entrepreneurial
states, the prospect of a major change in the international economic environment
stimulated no special activity at all.
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Table 1
Industrial Policy States and Europe 1992
Specific Specific 1992
No 1992 1992 1992 Seminars or
State Activity Program Publications Conferences
California — — X —
Connecticut — — X X
Illinois — — X X
Indiana X — — —
Maryland — X X —
Massachusetts — — — —
Michigan — — — —
Mississippi X — — —
Missouri — — — —
Montana X — — —
New Jersey — — X —
New York — X — —
Ohio X — — —
Pennsylvania X — — —
Rhode Island — X X —
Wisconsin X — — —
Added Special Upgrade No.
Trade 1992 European
State Activity Counselors Offices Offices
California X — X 2
Connecticut — — — 1
Illinois — — X 1
Indiana — — — 2
Maryland X X X 1
Massachusetts X — —
Michigan — — — 1
Mississippi — — — 1
Missouri — — X 1
Montana — — —
New Jersey — — —
New York — — X 2
Ohio — — — 1
Pennsylvania — — — 2
Rhode Island — — — 1
Wisconsin — — — 1
Source: Mail/phone survey of international trade directors.
Ten of the entrepreneurial states report some effort to take the new Europe into ac-
count, but even here the level of activity is low. Most concentrate on disseminating
information about the event, leaving their business communities to react as they
see fit. Five of the states have issued publications describing 1992, and three have
sponsored conferences or seminars. Two of the publications (prepared by outside
consultants) are quite elaborate and provide sophisticated analyses of 1992 and its
implications for American business.25 However, neither state reports following up
these publications with targeted activities or programs. Three of the states added
European trade shows to their calendars partly because of interest in 1992, and five
have upgraded their European offices. California added a second office in Frankfort
to take advantage of an expected increase in European export opportunities.
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Only three of the states, Rhode Island, New York, and Maryland, reported initi-
ating a special program focused on Europe 1992 as a vehicle for promoting exports.
The Rhode Island 1992 Commission kicked off its effort with a major conference on
European integration in May 1990. Attended by representatives from about three
hundred Rhode Island businesses, the conference introduced the 1992 Commission, a
creation of the lieutenant governor and the head of the U.S. branch of a British multi-
national, and offered a number of seminars on the implications of 1992 for Rhode
Island firms. In the following year, the commission met only once, and the center-
piece of its program, a mentoring program matching large companies with expertise
in European exporting with small and medium-size firms, was not implemented. So
far, Rhode Island's Europe 1992 program has had a false start. The New York pro-
gram consists of dissemination of information about the European Economic Com-
munity and what it means for New York businesses.
Only one of the entrepreneurial states has actually launched a major program to
take advantage of Europe 1992. Maryland's Opportunity '92 integrates informational
seminars, European trade shows, and business counseling into a single program,
which includes financial assistance to businesses to attend trade fairs. According to
the brochure describing it, the program is intended "to make the Port of Baltimore a
major gateway to the EC." With the possible exception of Maryland, the expectation
that a major event in the international political economy, like Europe 1992, would
produce a significant response in the entrepreneurial states has been disappointed.
The Entrepreneurial State?
None of the fifty states — and the entrepreneurial states are no exception— have
found more than token resources to commit to their export policies. In the 1980s
most states developed a range of programs to support the governor's foreign market-
ing efforts. All fifty states employ "international trade directors" in their economic
development offices, although many combine their international trade activities with
other duties. All but seven of the fifty maintain at least one overseas office, and most
have several. However, all these programs, including those in the sixteen
entrepreneurial states, are grossly understaffed. Of the tens of thousands of state
workers in each state, few are employed in export programs; exports remain a low in-
vestment priority despite the relatively high visibility given them by their governors.
In the entrepreneurial states, the average professional staff charged with im-
plementing state export policies consists of only nine persons, slightly better than the
average of six professionals in the other states. The foreign office staffs, developers
of trade shows and export leads, average only three persons in the entrepreneurial
states and two in the others (see Table 2). The Rhode Island effort is typical: its
European office employs one professional staffer and part-time clerical help.
The most popular activities in the states are also those which require a modest in-
vestment: seminars and conferences, dissemination of World Trade Center and Com-
merce Department sales leads, trade shows, and missions (see Table 1). One-on-one
counseling involves more extensive resource investments, but these activities are
usually rationed because of limited funding.26 The international trade specialists we
talked to in New England emphasized that counseling was among the most important
services they could provide, but also the most costly. They were acutely aware that
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their resources permitted helping only a small number of businesses that could
benefit from their services.27 Only seven of the fifty states have established export
finance programs, a more extensive commitment of resources. 28 Like entrepreneurial
policies in general, a great deal of export-related activity seems to be taking place in
the states, but the reality is considerably less than the appearance.
Table 2
Export Efforts of Industrial Policy and All Other States
High Industrial All Other
States
3
Policy States3 Statesb
Mean number of professionals on staff 9.03 5.81
Mean number of seminars per year 22.57 15.36
Mean number of staff in foreign offices 2.93 1 .87
Source: Data are from 1988 State Export Program Database of the National Association of State
Development Agencies.
aExcept for Wisconsin, which was missing from the NASDA data, these are the states listed in Table 1
.
bWashington, West Virginia, and Wyoming are missing from the NASDA data.
It is not surprising that the states are responding to Europe 1992 mainly by
publishing brochures. The reacting states have made little response to the European
initiative partly because they lack the resources to enter in a meaningful way. Cer-
tainly the effects of the 1990-1991 recession demonstrate the vulnerability of the
states to national economic forces and to fiscal crises. More than half the fifty
states ran deficits toward the end of the 1991 fiscal year,29 as they continued to be
squeezed by federal preemption of state revenue sources, the cost of federally man-
dated programs to the states, reductions in federal grants-in-aid, and soaring costs,
particularly for medical benefits for state employees and persons on relief.
Given the hard fiscal realities faced by the states, twenty-nine of which laid off
or furloughed workers and froze hiring in mid-1991,30 their resources continue to be
directed to their traditional responsibilities in education, public safety, maintenance
of infrastructure, health, and the like. The devastating impact of the recession on the
fiscal stability of California, New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, all entrepreneurial states, underlines a fun-
damental limitation to state policy: it cannot offset regional economic forces and the
national economy, although this is a frequent justification for state industrial policies.
Nor can state-level policies counteract national decisions on monetary, revenue, fis-
cal, banking, and interest policies, which affect the industrial structure. The interac-
tion of state economies with national economic forces and policies provides a
practical limit to what entrepreneurial states can do to promote their own economies.
Even if the states had discretionary resources to invest, we believe that they would
be inappropriate jurisdictions around which to initiate export policy. Reflection on
the major challenges Europe poses for American exports underscores this reality:
they fall mainly under the responsibility of the national government. The states, for
example, have no power to negotiate "rule of origin" requirements with the European
Community. The reform of banking laws to assure reciprocity in financial services re-
quires the revision of federal statutes like the McFadden and Glass-Steagall acts.
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Even changes in state regulations and tax laws to establish greater homogeneity in
the American market would require collective action on the part of the states. It is
unlikely such action could be achieved among the fifty states without concerted na-
tional leadership from the president and Congress. What needs to be done to respond
to Europe 1992 simply cannot be accomplished by the states alone.
Citizens have held state officials responsible for doing something, even though
limitations of constitutional structure and finances prevent meaningful action. The
response has been entrepreneurial activity that is largely symbolic and at most mar-
ginal in its impact on industrial adjustment.31 This becomes clearer if we look at the
export promotion activities of California, which has one of the more sophisticated
and extensive export promotion programs in the nation. With a professional staff of
about sixteen people and an annual budget of more than $10 million, the office is
among the five largest trade agencies in the country. In 1989 total California exports
equaled $43.4 billion, a figure the California State World Trade Commission seeks to
enhance. The agency's own estimate of its impact, $500 million in "preserved or
created" export sales over a six-year period, constitutes only one percent of total ex-
port sales in one year. Its largest-in-the-nation export finance program supported
about $100 million in sales in 1990, approximately 0.2 percent of 1989 exports.
Although the entrepreneurial state seems active in California, its impact has not
been great.
As the response to 1992 shows, the entrepreneurial state feels compelled in some
way to react to highly publicized world events. Meanwhile, the key determination of
the extent and terms of American access to the new Europe of the 1990s is up to the
national government to negotiate. The outcome of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) Uruguay round32 or the value of the dollar against European cur-
rencies will have much more to do with the volume of exports of businesses in
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Michigan than any 1992 state economic develop-
ment program. The rise of the entrepreneurial state does represent an interesting phe-
nomenon in state government in the last decade, but it is more a symbolic response
by state officials to the need for industrial adjustment to international competitive-
ness than an adequate solution to the problem.
There is a need for the infusion of reality into the discussion of the entrepreneurial
state and its activities. There is a role for states in economic development and in ex-
port policy as well, but that role is not the design, support, and implementation of
programs on a scale that can produce a measurable impact on state economies. The
states are well situated to reach the small and middle-size private firms that lack the
expertise or initiative to enter the export market yet could fill an important role in the
implementation of federally initiated and supported programs. A few of the states
have already built potentially workable small-scale models, such as the Export Assis-
tance Center in Rhode Island, which might provide ideas around which to structure
workable national programs. Governors might do well to press the federal govern-
ment to supply what they cannot: a coordinated export policy built on international
leverage and national leadership. **
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